By Felix Struening

“Immigrants tend on average to be more poorly educated and more frequently unemployed and to participate less in public life than the native population.” This first finding of the study “Unutilised Potentials” of the “Berlin-Institute for Population and Development” is not surprising at all. Yet behind the unassuming title, figures are conceal that are that brisance and distinct; it is hard to beat. The study is the first one in Germany that compared the success of integration of migrant groups from different countries of origin. For critical observers, the fact that the Turks got the worst results is hardly surprising, but it is a slap in the face for the defenders of multiculturism in Germany.

Migrants integrate differently – depending on their country of origin

This distinction of the immigrants became possible due to the initial polling of the migrant’s country of origin in the 2005 micro census by the Federal Statistical Bureau, an annual survey of one percent of the population living in Germany. The derived data is also so innovative because previous studies on migration only included foreigners. In the meantime, however, half of the 15 million migrants and their offspring living here have German citizenship “without thereby necessarily the integration problems are resolved.” This is 20 percent of the local population, which means Germany has a larger migrant population than any other European country. Given demographic trends, this proportion will increase even more in the future.

For a reasonable description, the immigrants were divided into eight regions or groupings: ethnic German immigrants (from the former Soviet Union, so called “Aussiedler”), Turkey, Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), other countries of the EU-25, the former Yugoslavia, Far East, Middle East and Africa. Thereby, undifferentiated data arise primarily in the regions from which two types of refugees migrated, respectively asylum applicants and – in contrast – highly qualified professionals, since the micro census does not specify the legal status for privacy reasons. Here, the editors of the study can only propose the very different integration achievements within each group of migrants and make presumptions based on the figures of the asylum applications from the interior ministry.

The question is why Afghanistan and Pakistan were included in the group “Far East” instead of “Middle East.” Here, the cultural background should be considered as more important than the geographical location. This leads to slightly unclear results of the Far East group. Therefore, very regrettably, one cannot see the values of each country, not even in the Annex.

Index for measuring integration

In order to investigate the different immigrant groups in terms of their integration, the experts of the Berlin-Institute developed an index for measuring integration (IMI). 15 indicators in the areas of assimilation, education levels, employment and financial backup address very different areas of life and should also be as independent as possible from each other. On the basis of five indicators, the immigrants and their next generation are compared dynamically, because the real success of integration is only measurable by the people born in the migrant country.

Generally, in all eight groups of migrants, there is a broad spectrum of integration success, but “migrants with a Turkish background tend by far to be the most poorly integrated group in Germany.” This is in spite of the fact that the Turks have already been in Germany for a long time, and half of them were born there. For example, the high unemployment rate also exists in the second generation and the level of educational has only subtly improved. With nearly one third without any education, the group of Turks is the least educated among all migrants.

The need for political action

The study is not only explosive in its findings, but also well presented. A little history of immigration into Germany since World War II and the presentation of the basic proportions of migrants in Germany provide an appropriate introduction. The statistical data are presented graphically and colour-coded, thus very easy to understand. Only the absence of the respective percentages in the bar and pie charts could be criticised. Due to the explanation of individual values and concepts, the study is also understandable for non-experts.

The well-documented index for measuring integration contains figures that should not only determine the current immigration policy, but also be included in every higher-education institution as a “must-read.” The different treatment of integration-willing migrants and those who live at the expense of the welfare state of the host society and isolate themselves from this society, must ultimately be a political reality. This study clearly indicates – without mentioning it explicitly, however – that migrants from countries with a strong Islamic influence integrate into German society much more poorly than migrants from non-Islamic countries. Additionally, the study also shows that how well migrates integrate depends mainly on the efforts of the migrants themselves.

In addition to the mentioned topics, the study also examines how well integration in different regions and cities in Germany functioned. It concludes with a chapter on the potential costs of failed integration. Here, however, the authors note that the available studies, such as of the Bertelsmann Foundation from 2008, result in very different figures due to different calculation models. But what they all have in common is that the lack of integration costs the host society a hell of a lot.

The blame for this can be given to the previous multicultural policy: “The vision of a multicultural society in which each ethnic group should be unaffected act out their character, never allowed real integration, but rather strengthened the live in those parallel societies, in which the lower classes of the cities mass.” For the researchers at the Berlin-Institute this means primarily “unutilised potential.” Therefore, probably the unassuming title of the study “On the current state of integration in Germany.”

Franziska Woellert, Steffen Kröhnert, Lilli Sippel, Reiner Klingholz: Unutilised Potentials. On the Current State of Integration in Germany, Berlin Institute for Population and Development, 2009.

The study is only published in German (PDF), but there is a English summary (PDF) and an abstract as well.

This review is a translation of the German review at BuchTest.

“Who is left, lives in the beautiful awareness, to be in the right, yes, simply to be allways right. In Germany, leftists don’t have to justify their view.” This general absolution of any (mis-)behavior is because of the missing of conservatives in all places where cultural and social decisions are made. “Go into any theater, a museum or an open-air: You will soon discover that ideas outside the leftist imagination, have no place in there. [...] The left won a comprehensive victory, it has become the Juste Milieu of those people, who define our culture.”

As such, one could summarize the essence of the current bestseller “Among Lefitsts” (Unter Linken) by the journalist Jan Fleischhauer (see the interview), an editor of the German magazine “Der Spiegel”. Even growing up in a through and through leftwing family, he became “conservative by accident”, as the subtitle of the book proclaims. At 350 narrow printed pages the author describes in a polemical and entertaining way, why the left is such mighty and why thus so much went wrong, in German politics.

The left is thereby opposed not only by conservatives, but by capitalism at the same time. Whereas the current financial crisis seems to prove the left to be right, at a second glance “capitalism is right to boast to redeem its promises exemplary. With socialism, it is regularly the other way round. It can not hold any of its promises, in fact, it went wrong every time, when its supporters were trying to implement bold ideas into reality.” Whereas after the socialist experiments everything is in ruins, capitalism is followed by democracy, prosperity and freedom. Crises like the present, are just normal, as Jan Fleischhauer somewhat laconically holds.

“At the beginning of all left politics stands the victim.”

The victim is the spritual food of the leftists, they can ignite and invent themselfs with it again and again, pointing out to real and perceived discriminations. The victim discourse thereby has a massive problem which even the left can not escape: If the victim status or the revolutionary anti-stance reversed, because the equality of the victim is reached or the left comes to power, new justifications for their own thinking and action need to be found.

By saving the whole nation, another problem of the leftists appears: the people, unfortunately, never do what the left intelligentsia have planed for them – but never for themselves. Really shameful Jan Fleischhauer recalls how the left-wing intellectuals – led by the appeasement author Günter Grass – rejected the German reunification, because the GDR was such a nice socialist experiment in a nice and safe glass box behind the Iron Curtain.

That the citizens of East Germany wanted capitalistic and political freedoms the West German left didn’t like at all. That the citizens of the GDR just took these freedoms and were welcomed by the Kohl government with open arms, was even worse. “It is every time a bitter experience for a movement that understands itself as an advocate of those at the bottom against the high society.”

Anti-Semitism and Turks

Anti-Semitism, the Holocaust and the guilt of the Germans are the other argumentative weapon of the leftists. It is especially likely used when it comes to issues of integration of foreigners, especially Muslims, Turks, respectively. Jan Fleischhauer, participants of the German Islam Conference (DIK), exemplifies at this event, as the supposed dialogue with the Muslims takes place: “You have to imagine the Islam Conference as a long therapy session, where every member of an ethnic minority in Germany describes the injustice that befalls or may befalls it. The dialogue is to assure each other how disadvantaged foreigners are in Germany.” The representatives of the German majority society better shut up.

But nobody considers, that Germany does as much for its immigrants, as probably no other country worldwide. The German welfare system already helps when somebody just got a residence permit in full measure, in return, nothing is demaned.

In the following the authors lists up the full horror of failed integration: lousy school education, even less professional qualification and a correspondingly heavy burden of the welfare system due to high unemployment among Muslim migrants are only some of the facts. The integration failed therefore primarily because of the appeasement policy and the multiculturalism of the German leftists. They would never call immigrants for accepting or even embracing our values. The exploitation of the Holocaust used here again and again, the author aptly calls the a “particularly aggressive variant of the victim discourse.”

Left vs. Right?

Several critics accused Jan Fleischhauer to use an outdated right-left scheme and to leave the post-ideological generations – probably the post 1968 generations – out. But Jan Fleischhauer doesn’t want to talk about political cleavages, but rather about how a generation has dominated our political-social image –with leftist ideology.

The conceptual vagueness to write about THE left, one can accuse January Fleischhauer, of course. But he said in the beginning of the book, to be aware of this haziness and generalization, but to use it in order to maintain intelligibility. The Left for him is “a philosophy of life, also a way of explaining the world, [...] and above all a feeling.” The Left has an “impressive theory” and is at the same time a “fiction”.

Thereby it is not that important, if the described people are clearly on the left, or rather communist or socialist. Instead, the author describes an attitude towards life in many different facets, which has enormous societal impacts. To be left, is for Jan Fleischhauer a dogma, which characterizes the appeasement politician, the multiculturalist, who is not ready, to hold his values above others. At the same time the described leftists are deeply fundamentalist. Left-wing is thereby less different from the right, as both sides often follow the same mechanisms. Left may be more the opposite of conservative, a distinction that meanwhile can be hardly drawn in the German political landscape.

A great Analysis

From an outside perspective on Germany the conservative view of the author is probably not that surprising. Regarding Islam and integration, for instance, Christopher Caldwell (“Reflections on the Revolution in Europe”) just shown an American picture of Europe, including Germany, that is beyond any left-wing political correctness. But German political books are often biased by the left cultural self-perception. Hence “Among Leftists” is a worth reading book on Germanys polical situation even for foreigners.

Jan Fleischhauer not only consideres the current situation, as many political books of the German super election year 2009 do (as you can see in this review). He also focuses not on a too simplistic “those on top are to blame” or the German party system. Rather, he gives a broader view, which stretches from the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau through Marx to the 1968-generation and its current positions of power.

The author doesn’t develop the satirical diction of Henryk M. Broder (“Hurray, we surrender!”). But his strength, however, lies in his philosophical erudition, in his many years of journalistic experience, and last not least in his political foresight. Perhaps not every argument may be consistent and perhaps some things are a bit far-fetched. But in its entirety, “Among Leftists” is a brilliant picture of our political situation. The leftists won’t like that, of course.

Please also note the interview with Jan Fleischhauer.

This review is a shortened translation of the German one at BuchTest.

By Felix Struening

The current geopolitical situation is characterized by a resurgence of the former great powers. The concept of the – mainly European and American – democracy is called into question by the successes of the autocratic regimes like China and Russia. Robert Kagan, foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate John McCain in 2008, already started in 2003 a broad discussion with his book “Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order”. Now he presents with “The Return of History” an essay that deals intensively with the conflict between democracy and autocracy. Thereby, he questiones the legitimacy of the hegemony of the United States as well as the domination of the democratic model itself.

The end of the political primacy

On the basis of the three paradigms of the diplomatic and political influence, military strength and above all the economic power, the author analyzes the countries Russia, China, Japan, India and Iran regarding their hegemony demands. He shows that the faith in political opening through economic recovery turned out to be false and how the primacy of politics over economy gets lost step by step. “Growing national wealth and autocracy have proven compatible. Autocrats learn and adjust. The Russian and Chinese autocracies have figured out how one can authorize a free market economy and simultaneously suppressing political activity. They have understood that people who make money, stay out of politics, especially when they know that an intervention will let them suffer.”

While the resurgence of the great powers and the conflict between democracies and autocracies seems to be problematic for the author, he sees no long-term problem in the global Islamism. Although these tendencies must be clearly countered at the political level, Islamism will be defeated by modernity, because of Islam’s backward-looking focus on its tradition. Correspondingly short, it is only the topic on a few pages. Similarly tight is the chapter on the hegemony of Iran, which leads to the conclusion, that Robert Kagan sees in the Islamic Republic only little danger.

Is democracy an end-of-range model?

In the political debate the discussion of a possible end of democracy increases. Above all, Colin Crouch developed in “Post Democracy” a concept, that sees democracy influenced by other factors, particularly the expansion of the capitalistic principle of proftablility to non-economic areas. But this implicitly still assumes that democracy is the right form of society and its disappearance a negative trend.

Robert Kagan now carefully dares to take a more open perspective, and, given the political reality to question democracy as such. Between the lines of his book you can read the question of whether democracy is not only a Eurocentric and U.S. policy model. From the perspective of China and Russia are the American democratization efforts in the former Soviet states, the Balkans and the Middle East, first of all U.S. expansionism in their own areas of hegemony. The great powers suddenly identify the interference in the politics of other countries illegal, because it contradicts their own interests. “This is one of the great schisms in the international system, which divide the democratic world and the autocracies. For three centuries was the law of nations, which regarded any interference in the internal affairs of other nations as inadmissible, but rather on the side of autocracies. Now the democratic world is about to reverse this protection, while autocracies will rush to defend the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty.” One of the examples of Kagan, is the NATO-led overthrow of Serbia, Russia tried to prevent.

In general, the author here touches on a moral paradox of the democratic social order, which is difficult to solve. To get or preserve democracy and its value system, undemocratic means are often necessary. Regarding foreign affairs, this usually means the use of military force, on the domestic front, the demarcation between freedom of the citizens and security of the state. Here it can be difficult to deal with individuals or groups who see their own values higher than the system of democratic principles. Tolerance and freedom the democratic state can only grant those social and religious groups who practice this principle of freedom also internal.

In the foreign affairs the liberal creed, that every person ascribes equal rights, which may be curtailed by any state, legitimates democracies, to interfere politically, economically and – if needed – militarily in the internal affairs of other states. But this is just under the premise that only democracies get these rights. Thus we Europeans and the Americans put democracy above of all other forms of government. But countries such as Russia or China, see democracy mere as one of the possible forms of government, and for nationalistic reasons they prefer autocracy. And even if these two great powers pursue not an ideological dissemination of autocracy, they offer protection and support to other autocracies. Whether this is now China’s influence in Africa and Asia, or particularly Russias patronage of the Islamic regime in Iran. With the growing economic power of Russia and China, the West has not only lost its monopoly of globalization, the two autocracies also ideologically become more role models.

Democracy in the empirical and normative comparison

The book is not especially innovative in its presentation of the political conditions, let alone that it creates new facts. His introductory narration of historical facts shows the generous, in global politics experienced storyteller, allowing also the political laymen to understand the following discussion. Robert Kagan is fundamental – despite his normative affirmation of democratic values – in his questioning of even these values because of the current geopolitical situation. This provides an approach that deprives democracy of its formal sanctity, then historicizes it and forces it into an empirical comparison with other forms of government. The question appears, if we can expect a country to democratize, if the autocracy is working well for the national interests, notably the economy and is accepted by most of the population, because of rising living standards?

Of course, normatively one wants to answer this question in the affirmative. But empirically, other factors must be considered. Thus, the mostly from outside established democratic elections in the Middle East and the states of North Africa, almost always led to a rise of Islamic fundamentalists. The last time this became clear in the electoral victory of the radical Islamic Hamas in the Palestinian autonomous areas. So, should the United States and other democracies encourage democratization in the Middle East? Robert Kagan sees the answer in turning around the question: “Should the U.S. support autocratic governments in the Middle East? This is, after all the alternative. There is no neutral stance on these issues.” That what we call a Realpolitik, the cooperation with autocracies, is therefore certainly needed. But we always have to apply pressure toward democratization and liberalization, states the author.

But we should consider in the juxtaposition of democratic and autocratic regimes even more circumstances. From a historical perspective, the forms of government of the great powers always have been role models. Whether this was the fascist nationalism in its expression of the German Empire, the communism of the Soviet Union or the current autocracies in China and Russia. They always have been and will be emulated by smaller or in world politics less important countries in order to obtain the support of the big ones. Whether the European democracies and the wave of democratization in the 1990s, are just a temporary model in a continuous timeline, or whether democracy is the most advanced form of government and thus the ultimate level of political participation and decision-making, is the crucial question.

“The great fallacy of our times is the belief that a liberal international order is based on the triumph of ideas and on the natural unfolding of human progress.” progress is neither inevitable, as the natural democratization of all countries. The examples of Russia and China show that rising wealth is not necessarily associated with political freedom.

Must we thus deny the ideological – or rather moral – superiority of democracy and see it therefore justified in geopolitical competition with the autocracies? Then of course we also have to criticize the hegemony of the United States, which brings us back to the question at the beginning. The alternative, a multipolar world order, also appears fair from a democratic perspective, however, involves much more danger. “A large part of the world tolerats the geopolitical preeminence of the United States not only, but they willingly support – not because people love America, but because they know that the U.S. will protect them against enemies who are more worrying.” Most countries should therefore prefer the compromise of the superpower United States. For its withdrawal would only shift the power to other interested parties.

Robert Kagan: The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Knopf 2008, ISBN-13: 978-0307269232, 19.95 $ (14.99 €); German translation: Die Demokratie und ihre Feinde. Wer gestaltet die neue Weltordnung?, Siedler, 2008, ISBN-13: 9783886808908, 16.95 €

This review is a tranlation of the German one at BuchTest, therefore the quotes are back-translations from the German book and not necessary identical with the original.

Jan Fleischhauer is a well known editor of the German magazine “Der Spiegel”. In 2009, he published one of the most disputatious books regarding the political situation in Germany over the last 40 years. “Among Leftists” (Unter Linken) immediately entered the bestseller list but was attacked at the same time by many critics. We spoke with the author about the actuality of the left-right schema, German students and Henryk M. Broder.

Mr. Fleischhauer, your book “Among Leftists” (Unter Linken) hits the (conservative) nail on the head. Why didn’t you write this book earlier? Was it previously not possible?

No idea. I had just reached a point where I felt the necessary power. It takes a certain basic energy to get over the distance of 350 pages, especially if one does something in addition to regular work. This energy was only here now.

You were immediately attacked by some critics, such as in fact more conservative FAS (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung) by Julia Encke. Did you expect that?

This was foreseeable. It was surprising to me that the first fundamental assault was carried out by the FAS. But at second glance it was not that amazing. The arts section of the FAS is a reliable bastion of the left thinking in Germany. The editors who work here go to work each day with a clenched fist and the settled conviction to give Volker Zastrow, who directs the policy section, and all the other conservatives a wipe out
at every possible opportunity.

I was the perfect object of hate. On the other hand: Did the criticism hurt? Absolutely not. It has promoted the debate, and that was good.

The critics often argue, that the left-right-schema is out of date. Must we now think in different and more complex schemes?

That’s what I hear, since I write about politics. But strangely: Just the two camps were re-elected in Germany by the voters quite impressive. It even speaks some evidence that we go after the end of the grand coalition, which has here led to some confusion, again in a time of clearer ideological differences.

Why are today still (almost) all the students leftists and select the party Die Linke?

All students? It is not that bad. In economics, law or science, the share does not exceed the socially acceptable cut, I would suspect. But for the humanities, the assumption is certainly correct. The reason is less rational rather than emotional. One would like be on the right side, stand for the good and noble, therefore the left seems to be the right choice. The promise of moral superiority is always something seductive.

How might a conservative cultural-politics-intelligentsia look like?

For this I lack imagination. Nor do I belive in intellectuals who gather under one flag. People who think similarly, will find each other, so I don’t worry. And if you remain in the minority it is also not bad.

You say that your book is a very personal one and the subtitle gives the impression of an autobiography. But isn’t “Among Leftists” rather the biography of an entire nation after the 2nd World War?

Well, maybe not of an entire nation, but of a generation with certainty. I did not stop at the sixty-eight-generation as do many who criticize the left, but I take the reader to a journey through the past 40 years of leftist mentality, history, enclosing the German Autumn (Deutscher Herbst) and the strange enthusiasm for the RAF, the nuclear death hysteria of the eighties and the New Inwardness (Neue Innerlichkeit*), the minority debates until the present time. This recognition effect is evidently also a part of success.

In a televised debate one of the presenters described the book as “a politically Generation Golf,” which is not so wrong regarding the biographical parts.

Henryk M. Broder said, that he would liked to have written your book. Instead he has written the book on Islam (“Hooray, we surrender”), you probably wanted to write. What have you both in common in your function as authors?

The fun of polemical pointed emphasis, a joy on the free thinking – and a certain fearlessness, perhaps. You should not be too sensitive when you point out your politically opinion that clear, as we both do it. Broder describes himself still as a leftist, but that is of course only a very nasty volte-face.

About which topic you’ll write your next book?

We will see. I have one or two ideas, but for now I take a rest. A few readers have encouraged me to write the next book about the conservatives. I do not know if I should do to you is: A book on the rightists would not be much more lenient than that now on the left, I fear.

—
* The New Inwardness (Neue Innerlichkeit), also New Subjectivity is a term invented by the literature critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki to describe a kind of German literature in the 1970s, which is characterized by personal experiences. It was a countermovement to the political literature of 1968.

So far, the book is only published in German:

This interview is a translation of the German version at BuchTest.

The year 2009 was a super election year in Germany. A total of 17 elections were held, including the election of the European Parliament and the German Federal President. The most important were of course the parliamentary elections (for the Bundestag). The newly-elected conservative-liberal government will be observed with great excitement: will there be changes, after four years of the grand coalition, which certainly had had the necessary majority of votes in parliament to effect change but ultimately lacked the will to do so. All this has led to political apathy; voter-turnout in 2009 was the lowest it has ever been.

Election campaigns, TV and Internet

The election campaign in Germany was full of boredom, the two catch-all parties CDU and SPD were far too sure of their victory, which paid at least the latter with the change on the bench of the opposition. The message of the SPD candidate Wolfgang Thierse for example was limited to the phrase, that one should vote his party. Why, he never explained. Specific intellectual pretension put the CDU/CSU to their voters. “If You want Merkel, you have to vote CDU”, is emblazoned on the posters just before the election day. Well, who would have thought, she is the chancellor candidate of the CDU.

The policy debates on television provoked only weary yawn, especially the TV duel between the two chancellor candidates. In the Internet there were the first real online election campaigns (especially the use of social media by the CDU!) and blogs of all coleurs made their comments in varying quality.

But even in the good old media book, many journalists, political scientists and the politicians themselves, of course, explain why who votes whom and in particular why the Germans do not want to go to the polls.

Many of the authors here show a great strength in the analysis of the political situation in Germany. But it is not too difficult to determine that, given disenchantment with politics, non-voters and party state, that there have to be some changes. Only in a few books, however, are constructive suggestions for improvements. This may be due to the deadlocked situation, and due to the fact that many of the authors are still extremely limited on the here and now.

Vote invalid?

A common pattern is pure scapegoating upwards. For example, the book “Let’s get Policy Back to Us” (Wir holen uns die Politik zurück) by the journalist Axel Brüggemann. He makes the mistake of not seeing politicians as normal people, but as something apparently different. But how does one becomes a politician, he does not explain. Brueggemann also fails to note that we probably get the government we deserve. The call for a German “Yes we can” also fades so unheard, because Merkel and Steinmeier are just sober politicians of a “realpolitik”. Leaving aside the fact that German politicians who want to lead Germany to world power, should also be seen internationally probably very critical.

Entangled in his argument, Axel Brueggemann himself repeats intellectual thought bubbles, emphasizes all too obvious but doesn’t answer the crucial question: Why is all this? The view of the current situation, thereby suppressing how good it is here in Germany, actually, how quickly democracy was introduced after World War II and how quickly the former GDR after reunification became part of the whole. Democracy has brought Germany above all, safety, freedom and prosperity. The final request of the author, to vote invalid in the general election, to show political displeasure, it must therefore be described as totally inappropriate.

Not to go to the polls?

Similarly, Gabor Steingarts “The Stolen Democracy” (Die gestohlene Demokratie) works, which he had originally published under the less sensational title “The question of power” (Die Machtfrage). The parties had been given too much power and democracy is no longer guided by political ideas, but by personal interests, argues the author. Since politicians like Willy Brandt in Germany belonged to the past and nowadays politicians are more like “political engineers” who do their job without enthusiasm, one would have no other choice than to choose not to go to the polls.

Furthermore, Gabor Steingart not only critizes the behavior of politicians, but the German proportional representation itself. The coalition of parties is arbitrary, as when the leftwing party “Die Linke” would come into a government, even though 90 percent of Germans had not chosen it. Still, that is one of the key points of the German electoral system. Considering Gabor Steingarts political experience – highly visible in his detailed analysis of the parties – it is the more surprising that he calls to not go to the polls, to deprive the parties the mandate to govern, because that would lead to even more arbitrary coalitions.

Unlike many other writers the Spiegel correspondent makes specific proposals to improve, even if they do not necessarily likely to be effective, let alone implement. Moreover, one has to thank the author and his publisher: They have included the discussion of the readers, which was formed to the first edition of the book in the paperback edition. That is at least a democratic behavior.

Without Prospects

A deeper and more scientifically analysis is offered by Matthias Machnig and Joachim Raschke in the book “Where shall Germany end up?” (Wohin steuert Deutschland?). In 32 contributions journalists and scientists analyze the state of the nation, but miss to develope a clear picture in the entirety. The book reads like a very current spotlight on a Germany that stands helpless before elections in which citizens have apparently no real alternatives. Low voter turnout and the politicians who are caring little for the concerns of the people and given election promises, apparently, are the primary German problems.

What the book is silent on all these issues is the fact that populism arises in many other European countries if people are not satisfied with the politics, while there is in Germany “just” a falling voter turnout. Of course, populism also grows here, lieke the party “Die Linke” with their irrational and unworkable demands on the political left edge. But it is elected primarily by those who have already obtained before any aliment of the state, can thus only be lured by politicians with empty promises.

Ultimately, the analysis of the context, the discursive reference to each other and the joint plot is missing. The two arrows pointing in opposite directions on the book cover symbolize the book as well as the political situation: there are no prospects.

There are a lot more books concerning the German elections in 2009, but this selection gives a good insight. So far, the books were just published in German:

Matthias Machnig, Joachim Raschke (Hg.): Wohin steuert Deutschland?. Bundestagswahl 2009 – Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen, Hoffmann und Campe 2009, ISBN-13: 9783455501131, 19.95 € (full German book review)

By Felix Struening

“Can Europe be the same, with different people in it?”, aks the U.S. journalist Christopher Caldwell. His answer is a resounding and distinct “No”. The Muslim mass immigration during the past 50 years has already changed Europe a lot. By the year 2050, family reunion and the Muslim fertility rate will do the rest. European politicians previously overestimated the necessity of foreign workers and still don’t understand the cultue-shaping power of Islam. As a consequence, the welfare state will soon collapse, and the political changes will be far-reaching.

The end of the welfare state

To prove these statements, Christopher Caldwell introduces in the first part of his book in the history of the (Muslim) Immigration in Europe. He points to the fundamental mistakes of political elites: In the beginning Europe just needed workers. But when they decided to stay, they got their families to join them. This and for example the death of heavy industry meant that although the number of foreigners living in Germany from 3 million in 1971 increased to 7.5 million by the millennium, the number of foreigners working, however, remained stable at 2 million.

Later, Europe’s politicians have argued with the demographic change on immigration. But the United Nations (“Replacement Migration”) have even calculated, that more than 701 million immigrants would have come into Europe since 1960, to balance the superannuation of the population. This would be far more people than living here right now. Moreover, as Christopher Caldwell cited a Spanish study found that even a massive influx yields liitle, since most migrants working in low-wage sector, and also are getting old and will claim their pensions.

The understanding of Islam

The other two parts of “Reflections on the Revolution in Europe”, dealing with Islam as a religion, the Muslims and Europe’s weakness, to oppose the political religion. Christopher Caldwell points again and again on Islam itself, and the fact that the Europeans underestimate “the culture-shaping potential of religion.” He asks the question if Islam itself can be the source of the terrorism practiced in its name or whether its a misuse of the religion. There is little sense speaking of ‘moderate Muslims’ if there are no ‘unmoderates’, be it in a religious or political way. “[W]ithout an underlying belief that there is something especially dangerous about Islam, the term ‘moderate Muslim’ makes no sense.” At the same time, the author suggested that Western politicians, especially after terrorist attacks, acquit Islam because they know in their bones, that it just happened because of Islam. Why else should Westerners have to explain to Muslims what is their belief or not?

For Christopher Caldwell it is also the Muslim population itself, which prepares European problems. Fundamentalists disrupt the co-existence, although obvious, but in the long run the simple presence of growing Muslim populations will take their toll. Between political Islam (ie the Muslim Brotherhood) and jihadism (by al-Qaeda, etc.) the author does not, however, differentiate, which leads to blur his concept of Islam a bit. Here a differentiation makes sense, like Thomas Tartsch has suggested in the German book “Da’wa and Jihad”.

Europe’s lack of response

The author shatters in his analysis European ideals in a accurate and sustainable way, such as a European Islam that is compatible to democrazy and liberal. Islam had great times, but “it is in no sense Europe’s religion and it is in no sense Europe’s culture.” Europe is in competition with Islam concerning the loyalty of the immigrants, only that Islam has currently the best cards, at least in terms of demography. If many Muslims migrate to Europe, it means, they prefer life there, but it does not necessarily mean that they want the European culture too.

Measures to integrate showed mainly the weakness of the Europeans, not to ask about other cultures because of the felt guilt for World War II, the Holocaust and colonialism. The dialogue with Islam is often naive, like the Islam-Konferenz (Islamic Conference) initiated by the German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.

The U.S. perspective

Christopher Caldwell writes from the perspective of an American journalist with a lot of European experience. He knows the European literature on Islam and immigration, he read Oriana Fallaci (“The Rage and the Pride,” “The Force of Reason”), as well as studies by the German Ministry of Interior (“Muslims in Germany”). His view from the outside seems to be non-dogmatic and distanced enough to light all facets of the immigration phenomena. The author always dicusses possible objections in order to disprove them afterwards thoroughly.

The book addresses very clear an American audience, because the author uses repeatedly comparisons to the developments in the United States to clarify what is happening similar, but above all, what works in Europe otherwise. At the same time, however, the work stands out for the European reader with clarity, even by political incorrectness to venture here, unfortunately, only a few authors. A journalist working up with scientific precision as that of Christopher Caldwell is found rather rare. There remains hope that “Reflections on the Revolution in Europe”, will be translated into German (and other languages) and won’t be limited to the English-speaking world such as Bat Ye’ors “Eurabia”.

Christopher Caldwell: Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. Immigration, Islam and the West, Penguin, 2009, ISBN-13: 9780713999365, 13.95 €

This is a translation of the German book review by the author at BuchTest.